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COMMENT

A Cure for Laryngitis:
A First Amendment Challenge to the NLRA’s
Ban on Secondary Picketing
JOSEPH L. GUZA†
[F]reedom of speech does not exist in the
abstract. On the contrary, the right to speak can
flourish only if it is allowed to operate in an
effective forum . . . . For in the absence of an
effective means of communication, the right to
speak would ring hollow indeed.1
INTRODUCTION
Labor is losing its voice.2 In fact, for almost the last
half-century, the American labor movement has been
† J.D. Candidate, Class of 2012, University at Buffalo Law School. I would like
to thank Rich Forester, Tom Bush, Gordon Yohe, and all the other dockmen and
truck drivers who, by example, taught me what it means to truly work for a
living; this one‘s for you guys. Thanks to my wife, Angela, who has been
relentlessly patient with the demands of law school. Thanks are also due to
Richard Lipsitz, Sr., Esq. and Professor Dianne Avery, for reviewing earlier
drafts of this Comment. Finally, I would like to thank Richard D. Furlong, Esq.,
for helping me formulate the topic of this paper, and for inspiring and
encouraging my interest in labor law.
1. CBS v. Democratic Nat‘l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 193 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
2. In fact, as this Comment was being drafted, a national attack on public
employee collective bargaining rights was already well underway. See, e.g.,
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suffering a serious decline.3 While many factors have
contributed to this deterioration, one major factor has been
the National Labor Relations Act‘s (―NLRA‘s‖) ban on
secondary labor picketing. The ban was first created by
amendment to the Wagner Act, the original NLRA.4
Specifically, the Taft-Hartley5 and Landrum-Griffin Acts6
emasculated the NLRA by instituting a number of union
unfair labor practices that severely limited the protection
afforded union activity under the Wagner Act.7 In
particular, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)8 of the NLRA broadly
prohibits union secondary boycotts, including secondary
picketing.9 While members of the United States Supreme
Court were initially suspicious of the constitutionality of the
broad coverage and vague language of the secondary
picketing prohibition,10 the Court has since reasoned that
David Schaper, Union Battles: A „National Campaign‟ Against Labor?, NPR
(Feb. 27, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/27/134064498/union-battles-anational-campaign-against-labor.
3. See Ryan Witt, A History Lesson on Union Power, the Law, and Income
Growth Rates in America, EXAMINER.COM (Mar. 3, 2011, 10:14 AM),
http://www.examiner.com/political-buzz-in-national/a-history-lesson-on-unionpower-the-law-and-income-growth-rates (showing the decline in union density
from 1970-2011); see also JOE BURNS, REVIVING THE STRIKE: HOW WORKING
PEOPLE CAN REGAIN POWER AND TRANSFORM AMERICA 11-70 (2011) (describing
the rise and decline of the labor movement from the 1930s through today).
4. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)).
5. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61
Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (2006)).
6. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959, Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.
(2006)).
7. See Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 8(b) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (2006)); Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act § 704 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (2006)).
8. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (2006).
9. Id. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
10. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen (Tree Fruits),
377 U.S. 58, 70-73 (1964) (holding that peaceful secondary pickets confined to
dissuading customers from buying a primary employer‘s products are allowed
under the NLRA).
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the inherently coercive nature of picketing and the
commercial nature of labor speech renders it unprotected by
the First Amendment.11
Nonetheless,
the
Court‘s
First
Amendment
jurisprudence and the dubious distinction between
secondary labor pickets and other types of picketing
continue to cast doubt on the constitutionality of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B).12 Moreover, in recent years, commentators
have suggested new ways of interpreting section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) so as to avoid First Amendment problems.13
Even the National Labor Relations Board (―NLRB‖) has
begun reevaluating the breadth of the secondary boycott
prohibition in light of potential First Amendment issues. 14
11. See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 61415 (1980) (holding that the NLRA prohibits secondary boycotts of individual
products when such boycotts threaten a business with ruin or substantial loss);
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1980) (suggesting that non-labor
picketing should be subject to less restrictions than labor picketing (citing
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 444-49 (1970))).
12. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (holding that
the First Amendment forbids attempts to exclude particular viewpoints that
may be disfavored); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 804 (1984) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits governmental
regulation of disfavored viewpoints); First Nat‘l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (―The inherent worth of . . . speech in terms of its capacity
for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether
corporation, association, union, or individual.‖).
13. See Barbara J. Anderson, Comment, Secondary Boycotts and the First
Amendment, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 811 (1984) (suggesting new framework for
determining whether activity is coercive); Dan Ganin, Note, A Mock Funeral for
a First Amendment Double Standard: Containing Coercion in Secondary Labor
Boycotts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1539, 1573-83 (2008) (arguing for a new conception of
coercion that avoids restricting protected speech); Kate L. Rakoczy, Comment,
On Mock Funerals, Banners, and Giant Rat Balloons: Why Current
Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act
Unconstitutionally Burdens Union Speech, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1621, 1646-54
(2007) (suggesting the use of a new ―coercion test‖ to protect unions‘ free speech
rights).
14. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Local 15 (Brandon Reg‘l Med. Ctr.), 365
N.L.R.B. No. 162, at 4 (May 26, 2011) (―If the First Amendment protects conduct
or statements as disturbing to many as [picketing a military funeral], surely
prohibiting an inflatable rat display, with a handbill referring to a ‗rat
employer,‘ would raise serious constitutional concerns.‖); United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506 (Eliason & Knuth of Ariz.,
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This continued uncertainty and debate over which activities
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) actually prohibits suggests a problem
with the statute itself.
This Comment argues that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), insofar
as it sweeps in peaceful secondary labor picketing, violates
the First Amendment‘s protection against viewpoint
discrimination, and should be found unconstitutional in the
next appropriate case to reach the Supreme Court. Part I
will discuss the historical development of the NLRA‘s ban
on secondary boycotts and its coverage of secondary
picketing. Part II will discuss the Supreme Court‘s
reasoning concerning the picketing ban and the First
Amendment, as well as the Supreme Court‘s First
Amendment jurisprudence concerning secondary picketing
other than labor picketing.15 Part III will rebut the Court‘s
arguments that labor picketing is inherently coercive and
unworthy of the heightened protection owed to political
speech.16 Finally, free from the distinctions the Supreme
Court has erected between secondary labor picketing and
other types of picketing,17 Part IV will argue, first, that
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination, and second, that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is
unconstitutionally vague. The Comment will conclude with
Inc.), 355 N.L.R.B. No. 159, at 14-15 (Aug. 27, 2010) (finding union bannering at
secondary target did not violate section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and construing statute in
light of Supreme Court‘s doctrine of interpreting statutes narrowly to avoid
constitutional issues).
15. The Supreme Court‘s treatment of labor and constitutional issues in
general, both before and after the passage of the NLRA, has left what one
commentator terms ―the labor black hole in the Constitution.‖ James Gray Pope,
Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 1071, 1074 (1987). But see Brief for Labor Law Professors as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 19, Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union Local 8, 239 P.3d 651 (Cal. 2010) (No. S185544)
(accepting as obvious that the Supreme Court has not given full First
Amendment protection to labor speech, but that the rights codified in the NLRA
and other statutes require a careful balancing of interests that justifies the
curtailing of First Amendment protection).
16. See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, 447 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
17. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1980).
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a meditation on a secondary picketing case in which the
Court ought to find the statute unconstitutional.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT BAN
Secondary
boycotts
have
been
defined
as
―combination[s] to harm one person by coercing others to
harm him.‖18 In the labor context, unions used secondary
boycotts to indirectly pressure employers with which they
had a labor dispute by targeting the employer‘s clients,
suppliers, and other business associates.19 Thus, strikes,
pickets, handbilling, and other actions directed at these
secondary targets were deemed ―secondary boycotts.‖20 Such
activities have long been the subject of legal controversy,21
and it is important to understand how the legal status of
the secondary boycott has evolved over time. This is
especially important since the ban on secondary labor
picketing arose in this context.22
A. From “Criminal Conspiracy” to the Wagner Act
As Richard Bock points out, ―[e]ven before 1900, courts
routinely held secondary boycotts unlawful as criminal
conspiracies.‖23 While the analogy to conspiracy was eroded
over time,24 later courts of equity used the broad application

18. DUANE MCCRACKEN, STRIKE INJUNCTIONS IN THE NEW SOUTH 13 (1931)
(citing L.D. CLARK, THE LAW OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF LABOR 290 (1911)).
19. See Richard A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts: Understanding NLRB
Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 905, 908 (2005).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 908-18.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 908 (citing DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE LIBERALISM 70-72 (1995); RALPH M.
DERESHINSKY ET AL ., THE NLRB AND SECONDARY BOYCOTTS 1 (rev. ed. 1981)).
24. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111, 129-30 (1842) (holding
that labor organizations are not generally subject to the law of criminal
conspiracy).
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of antitrust law to enjoin union secondary boycott activity.25
The Sherman Antitrust Act26 was interpreted to apply
broadly to union activities, and the earliest injunctions
under the Sherman Act involved secondary activity.27 The
most renowned example of this appears in the Supreme
Court‘s decision in Loewe v. Lawlor,28 where the Court
applied section 7 of the Sherman Act to a union‘s
nationwide boycott of a hat manufacturer in an attempt to
organize the manufacturer‘s employees.29 The union‘s
organizing effort included secondary boycotts of wholesalers
and shops that handled the manufacturer‘s products, which,
the Court held, violated the Act.30
Congress attempted to reverse the Loewe decision by
passing the Clayton Act,31 but the Supreme Court soon held
that the Act did not protect secondary boycotts, holding
instead that the Clayton Act gave employers a private right
of action to seek injunctive relief and treble damages for
unions‘ secondary boycott activity.32 Not until 1932, after
years of labor unrest and lobbying, did Congress provide
meaningful statutory protection for union activity.33
The Norris-LaGuardia Act broadly protected union
activity—including secondary boycotts—from injunctive
25. See Bock, supra note 19, at 908 (citing DERESHINSKY ET AL., supra note 23,
at 1).
26. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006)).
27. See id.
28. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
29. Lowe, 208 U.S. at 304-05; see also Bock, supra note 19, at 909.
30. See Lowe, 208 U.S. at 304-05, 309.
31. Antitrust Act of 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006)). The Clayton Act was explicit in providing that,
―[n]othing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations . . .
nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust
laws.‖ Id. § 6 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006)).
32. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters‘ Ass‘n, 274 U.S. 37,
54-55 (1927); see also Bock, supra note 19, at 910.
33. See Bock, supra note 19, at 910.
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relief.34 Shortly after enacting Norris-LaGuardia, Congress
passed the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933
(―NIRA‖), featuring the first statutory protections of the
right to organize and bargain collectively, as part of the
New Deal.35 While NIRA was not able to survive
constitutional challenge,36 the Wagner Act, the original
NLRA, was passed in 1935.37 The Wagner Act established
and protected employees‘ organizational and collective
bargaining rights,38 prohibited a number of employer ―unfair
labor practices,‖39 and contained procedures for establishing
a union‘s status as a representative of employees.40 The Act
became the first New Deal legislation to survive a
constitutional challenge.41
Already bolstered by the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner
Acts, labor rights seemed to reach their pinnacle when the
Supreme Court definitively denied the applicability of the
antitrust laws to organized labor activity.42 While unions
still faced the possibility of violating state antitrust laws,43
34. Norris-LaGuardia Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (2006)); see also Bock, supra note 19, at 910.
35. See National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. No 73-67, 48 Stat.
195, invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935).
36. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 550 (holding NIRA
unconstitutional).
37. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)).
38. Id. § 7 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157).
39. Id. § 8(1) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)).
40. Id. § 9 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 159).
41. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937).
42. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231, 236 (1941) (holding
the Sherman Act inapplicable to boycott of company products due to the
safeguards provided by the Norris-LaGuardia and Clayton Acts); Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503, 512-13 (1940) (holding the Sherman Act
inapplicable to a sit down strike because the strike was not intended to restrain
trade within the meaning of the Act).
43. See, e.g., Carpenters & Joiners Union of Am. v. Ritter‘s Café, 315 U.S.
722, 727-28 (1942) (holding that picketing a neutral restaurant can be enjoined
by state antitrust law consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process
Clause).
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they remained relatively free to engage in secondary
boycotts and other secondary activities.44 But soon this
would change.
B. Taft-Hartley, Landrum-Griffin, and the NLRA‟s
Secondary Boycott Ban
In 1947, facilitated by the Republican takeover of both
the House of Representatives and the Senate,45 Congress
passed the Labor-Management Relations Act,46 informally
dubbed the Taft-Hartley Act, after the Act‘s sponsors,
Senators Robert Taft (R-OH) and Fred Hartley, Jr. (R-NJ).47
John L. Lewis, President of the United Mine Workers of
America, called the Act ―the first ugly, savage thrust of
Fascism in America,‖ while others dubbed it a ―slave-labor
law.‖48 President Truman attempted to prevent the
enactment of Taft-Hartley, but his veto was overridden.49
The President warned Congress that Taft-Hartley held
―seeds of discord which would plague [the] nation for years
to come‖ and would ―reverse the basic direction of [the
United States‘] national labor policy.‖50 He was not
mistaken.
Intended to be part of ―conservative America‘s own ‗new
deal,‘‖51 the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA sought,
44. See HAROLD W. METZ, L ABOR POLICY OF THE F EDERAL G OVERNMENT 4057 (1945) (discussing unions‘ rights to strike, picket, and boycott after passage of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act).
45. See PHILIP DRAY, THERE IS POWER IN A UNION: THE EPIC STORY OF LABOR IN
AMERICA 495-99 (2010) (discussing the political atmosphere surrounding the
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act).
46. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. 80-101, 61 Stat.
136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (2006)).
47. DRAY, supra note 45, at 496 (indicating the act would become known as
the Taft-Hartley Act).
48. Id. at 498.
49. Id. at 498-99.
50. Id. (quoting ROBERT D. PARMET, THE MASTER OF SEVENTH AVENUE: DAVID
DUBINSKY AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 217 (2005); IRVING RICHTER,
LABOR‘S STRUGGLES: 1945-1950, at vii (1994)).
51. Id. at 496.
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among other things, a return to the common law prohibition
of secondary boycotts.52 Taft-Hartley‘s secondary boycott
provisions included the availability of injunctive relief and
required the regional offices of the NLRB to pursue such
relief upon evidence of a violation.53 While definitively
reversing or curbing many of the advances organized labor
had won through the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia and
Wagner Acts, the Taft-Hartley amendments contained a
number of loopholes that allowed unions to avoid some of
the new legal consequences of engaging in secondary
boycotts.54
The Taft-Hartley loopholes only served as temporary
shelter from the increasing intensity of anti-union
legislation.55 In 1959, Congress set out to close these
loopholes with the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act.56
The Landrum-Griffin amendments tightened and broadened
the NLRA‘s restrictions on secondary boycotts,57 leaving us
with the statute we have today.58
52. Bock, supra note 19, at 913.
53. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 10(l), 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (2006); see
also Bock, supra note 19, at 913.
54. There were four major loopholes, as defined by Richard Bock: (1) the
definitions of ―employee‖ and ―employer‖ excluded certain groups from the Act‘s
coverage and thus exempting them from coverage of the secondary boycott ban;
(2) the Act left open the possibility of unions appealing to single employees or
working on a one-by-one basis to achieve secondary boycotts; (3) the Act did not
explicitly prohibit direct action against neutral employers; and (4) the Act did
not explicitly forbid unions and neutral employers to enter into voluntary ―hot
cargo‖ agreements. Bock, supra note 19, at 913-14.
55. Id. at 914.
56. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959, Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.
(2006)). The LMRDA is colloquially known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, after its
sponsors, Phillip Landrum (D-GA) and Robert Griffin (R-MI). See DRAY, supra
note 45, at 545-46.
57. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act § 704 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158).
58. See Bock, supra note 19, at 914-15. One commentator has dubbed the
NLRA, as it exists after the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin amendments, ―a
statute at war with itself.‖ Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for SelfRule: Unions, Associations, Our First Amendment Discourse and the Problem of
DeBartolo, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 149, 153.
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While commentators have noted the byzantine language
of section 8(b)(4)(B),59 the basic purpose of the statute is to
shield a neutral party ―from pressure imposed due to
controversies not its own.‖60 Section 8(b)(4)(i) forbids
engaging in strikes and work stoppages and inducing others
to do the same.61 Section 8(b)(4)(ii) forbids threats, coercion,
and restraining others.62 Both sections apply to actions that
have an object described in section 8(b)(4)(B).63 Despite the
long list of prohibited objects, section 8(b)(4)(B)‘s focus is on
union activity that forces the neutral secondary target to
―cease doing business‖ with the primary employer.64 Thus,
any secondary activity falling under section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) or
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is not protected by the NLRA if the
object of the activity is to get the secondary target to ―cease
doing business‖ with the primary disputant.65 Of particular
59. See Bock, supra note 19, at 917. Section 8(b)(4)(B) makes it an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents:
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed
by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials or commodities or to
perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in
either case an object thereof is—
....
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in products of any other producer,
processor, manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person . . . Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be
construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any
primary strike or primary picketing . . . .
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B)
(2006).
60. Bock, supra note 19, at 917.
61. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i); Bock,
supra note 19, at 917.
62. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii); Bock,
supra note 19, at 917.
63. Bock, supra note 19, at 917.
64. Id.
65. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B).
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interest is the resulting ban on secondary labor picketing
provided by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
C. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and Secondary Picketing
The language of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) sweeps a number
of activities under its umbrella, including secondary labor
picketing. The operative language of the statute makes it an
unfair labor practice ―to threaten, coerce, or restrain any
person‖ with the object of compelling that person ―to cease
doing business with any other person.‖66 Secondary labor
picketing, which traditionally involves several union
members holding signs and marching in front of a
secondary target, falls under this section because a common
object of such picketing is to get the secondary business to
stop doing business with the union‘s primary target.67 This
pressure has traditionally been viewed as ―coercive.‖68
While the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) has vacillated,69 the legislative history of the
Landrum-Griffin Act supports a plain reading of the
statute, making clear that the statute was intended to
broadly prohibit secondary activity, with the exception of
―publicity . . . for the purpose of truthfully advising the
public.‖70 For instance, then Senator John F. Kennedy,
66. Id. § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
67. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen (Tree Fruits),
377 U.S. 58, 77 (1964) (―Picketing, in common parlance and in § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B),
includes at least two concepts: (1) patrolling, that is, standing or marching back
and forth or round and round on the street, sidewalks, private property, or
elsewhere, generally adjacent to someone else‘s premises; (2) speech, that is
arguments, usually on a placard, made to persuade other people to take the
picketers‘ side of a controversy.‖).
68. Ganin, supra note 13, at 1543 (―The common law view of illegality rested
upon the presumption that secondary pressure was inherently and categorically
coercive.‖ (citing JOHN W. WHITEHEAD, THE RIGHT TO PICKET AND THE FREEDOM
OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE 70-71 (1984))).
69. See infra Part II.
70. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (―Provided
further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in
such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for
the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members
of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer
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reporting on the compromise reached in the final LandrumGriffin bill, stated:
[T]he House bill prohibited the union from carrying on any kind of
activity to disseminate informational material to secondary sites.
They could not say that there was a strike in a primary plant.
...
Under the language of the conference, [ultimately resulting in
present section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)] we agreed there would not be
picketing at a secondary site. What was permitted was the giving
out of handbills or information through the radio, and so forth.71

Senator Kennedy stated further:
Under the Landrum-Griffin bill it would have been impossible for
a union to inform the customers of a secondary employer that that
employer or store was selling goods which were made under
racket conditions or sweatshop conditions, or in a plant where an
economic strike was in progress. We were not able to persuade the
House conferees to permit picketing in front of that secondary shop,
but we were able to persuade them to agree that the union shall
be free to conduct informational activity short of picketing. In
other words, the union can hand out handbills at the shop, can
place advertisements in newspapers, can make announcements
over the radio, and can carry on all publicity short of having
72
ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site.

Senator Kennedy‘s remarks clearly demonstrate the
legislature‘s intention to broadly prohibit secondary
picketing as an unfair labor practice under section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B).73 While one might argue that such a broad
restriction helps to reduce industrial labor strife,74 it also
with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by
another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing
any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer in the
course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or
not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in
such distribution.‖).
71. 105 CONG. REC. 17,720 (1959).
72. 105 CONG. REC. 17,898-99 (1959) (emphasis added).
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 61718 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (―I am reluctant to hold unconstitutional
Congress‘ striking of the delicate balance between union freedom of expression
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raises First Amendment concerns about content-based
viewpoint limitations on the free speech of unions and their
members.75
II. THE SUPREME COURT‘S FIRST AMENDMENT DOUBLE
STANDARD
The broad ban placed on secondary labor picketing has
plagued the Supreme Court since the inception of the TaftHartley and Landrum-Griffin amendments, requiring the
Court to develop various theories to avoid an interpretation
of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) that would violate the protections of
the First Amendment.76 While the Court has continued to
distance itself from the constitutional issues surrounding
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)‘s ban on secondary picketing, it has
developed a body of First Amendment jurisprudence that
suggests that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) both creates an
impermissible viewpoint restriction on free speech and is
unconstitutionally vague.77 A successful argument based on
either of these grounds would require the invalidation of
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
The Supreme Court, however, has identified
distinctions between secondary labor picketing and political
speech that serve as barriers to raising the constitutional
issue.78 Thus, before arguing that the NLRA‘s ban on
secondary picketing is unconstitutional, it will be necessary
to review some of the Supreme Court‘s decisions concerning
the constitutionality of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), as well as some
and the ability of neutral employers, employees, and consumers to remain free
from coerced participation in industrial strife.‖).
75. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen (Tree
Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 76-80 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
76. See Ganin, supra note 13, at 1540-51.
77. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 957-60 (2010) (viewpoint
discrimination); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265-67 (1997)
(vagueness); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
801-04 (1984) (viewpoint discrimination); First Nat‘l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 784-86 (1978) (viewpoint discrimination); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360, 366-72, 379 (1964) (vagueness).
78. See infra Part II.A-B.
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of the Court‘s decisions concerning the First Amendment
protection of non-labor picketing.
A. Secondary Picketing and the First Amendment
Since the passage of the Landrum-Griffin amendments,
the Supreme Court has rarely dealt substantively with the
constitutionality of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) as it applies to
secondary labor picketing.79 The Court has never found the
statute unconstitutional, but an overview of some of the
cases highlights the tension between First Amendment
protection and the ban on secondary picketing.
The Supreme Court first addressed the secondary
picketing ban in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers &
Warehousemen (Tree Fruits).80 In Tree Fruits, a union struck
companies that sold apples produced in the state of
Washington to Safeway supermarkets.81 In furtherance of
the strike, the union initiated secondary pickets outside
several Safeway stores in an effort to persuade customers
not to purchase the apples.82 While the union members
marched in front of customer entrances, they did not impede
deliveries or prevent customers from entering the stores. 83
The Court‘s task was to decide whether the union‘s
picketing was coercive under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).84
While the Court was concerned that ―a broad ban
against peaceful picketing might collide with the guarantees
of the First Amendment,‖85 the Court ultimately found that
the legislative history and language of the statute did not
provide sufficient evidence of Congress‘s intent to prohibit
all secondary picketing.86 In his majority opinion, Justice
Brennan drew a distinction between picketing aimed at one
79. See e.g., Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 65-68; Safeco, 447 U.S. at 611-12.
80. See Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 63-67.
81. Id. at 59-60.
82. Id. at 60.
83. Id. at 61.
84. See id. at 59.
85. Id. at 63.
86. Id. at 63-69, 71-73.
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struck product and picketing aimed at a secondary target‘s
entire business.87 Justice Brennan found that secondary
picketing aimed at only one struck product was not coercive,
reasoning that coercion is not a function of economic loss
but of whether the picketing in question ―creates a separate
dispute with the secondary employer.‖88 Since the union was
picketing against the one struck product, the picket was less
like secondary activity than primary activity.89
While the Court‘s holding was favorable to the union, it
ultimately raised the constitutionality of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) only to avoid the issue.90 Having found the
union‘s picketing non-coercive under the statute, it found no
need to address the First Amendment issue.91 Moreover, a
reading of Justice Harlan‘s dissent suggests that the Court
was playing fast and loose in its reliance on legislative
history.92 As Justice Harlan indicated, the legislative history
is riddled with statements from senators, both for and
against the Landrum-Griffin Act, that clearly evidence the
legislature‘s intent to prohibit all secondary picketing.93
Further, Justice Black, agreeing with Justice Harlan‘s
portrayal of the broad secondary picketing ban, found
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) unconstitutional on First Amendment
grounds.94 Black, in his concurrence, found that the statute
was an impermissible viewpoint restriction that only
banned picketing ―when picketers express particular views,‖
noting that:
[W]hen conduct not constitutionally protected, like patrolling, is
intertwined, as in picketing, with constitutionally protected free
speech and press, regulation of the non-protected conduct may at
the same time encroach on freedom of speech and press . . . . [I]t is
difficult to see that the section in question intends to do anything
87. Id. at 63.
88. Id. at 72.
89. See id.
90. See Ganin, supra note 13, at 1549.
91. See Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 63-73; see also Ganin, supra note 13, at 1549.
92. See Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 84-92 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 76-80 (Black, J., concurring).
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but prevent dissemination of information about the facts of a labor
95
dispute – a right protected by the First Amendment.

More than ten years later, the Court addressed Justice
Black‘s First Amendment concerns in NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees Union (Safeco).96 In Safeco, a union had a
primary dispute against an insurance underwriter. 97 The
union subsequently picketed title companies that derived
over ninety percent of their profits from the underwriter‘s
policies.98 Even though, as in Tree Fruits, the union only
picketed one product,99 the Court found the union‘s
picketing coercive in violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).100
For the Court, the distinguishing feature of the
picketing in Safeco was that it threatened the secondary
target with ―ruin or substantial loss,‖101 i.e., the picketing
was effective. On finding the picketing violated the Act, the
Court held that the NLRA‘s ban on secondary picketing did
not violate the First Amendment.102 Despite the plurality‘s
quick dismissal of the free speech issue, Justice Blackmun
and Justice Stevens each had more ―substantial rationales‖
for defending the constitutionality of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).103
Blackmun thought the plurality should have considered
whether
the
ban
on
secondary
picketing
was
constitutional,104 but concluded that the ban was tolerable
since Congress was ―striking [a] delicate balance between
union freedom of expression and the ability of neutral
employers, employees, and consumers to remain free from
coerced participation in industrial strife.‖105 While
95. Id. at 77-78.
96. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
97. Id. at 610.
98. Id. at 609.
99. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 70.
100. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 614-15.
101. Id. at 614.
102. Id. at 616.
103. Ganin, supra note 13, at 1550.
104. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 616-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 617-18.
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expressing reservations, Justice Blackmun‘s concurrence
ultimately supported the idea that secondary labor
picketing was in itself coercive.106 Justice Stevens, however,
went further than Blackmun‘s balancing rationale,
advancing a substantive ―speech-plus‖ argument to
distinguish labor picketing from other speech that received
greater protection under the First Amendment.107
Stevens invoked a speech/conduct dichotomy introduced
by the Court in Cox v. Louisiana.108 The dichotomy rejected
the notion that the First Amendment provided ―the same
kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by
conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing‖ as it
gives ―those who communicate ideas by pure speech.‖109 In
Stevens‘ opinion, ―the conduct element[,] rather than the
particular idea being expressed[,]‖ is usually ―the most
persuasive deterrent‖ in the labor context.110 Thus, under
Stevens‘ reasoning, the NLRA‘s ban on secondary picketing
is permissible because it only affects ―that aspect of the
union‘s efforts to communicate its views that calls for an
automatic response to a signal, rather than a reasoned
response to an idea.‖111 As Dan Ganin explains, under this
―speech-plus doctrine . . . labor protests lose their First
Amendment protection when they persuade by force of
conduct rather than cogency of ideas.‖112 The upshot of all
this, however, is that—under Stevens‘ formulation—labor
picketing falls outside First Amendment protections,
because it triggers ―a reflexive response.‖113 The result is
that labor picketing is regarded as inherently coercive, a
position that harkens back to the old common law view of

106. See id.
107. See id. at 618-19 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that picketing is a
mixture of both speech and conduct).
108. 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
109. Id.; Ganin, supra note 13, at 1551.
110. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).
111. Id.
112. Ganin, supra note 13, at 1551.
113. Id.; see Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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labor unions as criminal conspiracies.114 Unfortunately,
Justice Stevens‘ concurrence provided an ―enduring
justification[] for constitutionally barring labor picketing.‖115
B. Non-Labor Picketing and the First Amendment
Outside the labor arena, the Supreme Court is
extremely protective of picketing activity.116 In fact, in a
trilogy of First Amendment picketing cases, the Supreme
Court goes so far as to erect a wall separating labor
picketing from certain types of ―public issue‖ picketing—
justifying the ban on secondary labor picketing, while
effectively immunizing other types of picketing from
content-based restrictions.117 While this may not be
surprising—given the Court‘s imprimatur of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B)‘s constitutionality—at one point it seemed
possible that the Supreme Court might invalidate the
NLRA‘s secondary picketing ban based on its First
Amendment jurisprudence.118
In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, the Court
invalidated a non-picketing ordinance for drawing ―an
impermissible distinction between labor picketing and other

114. See supra Part I.A.
115. Ganin, supra note 13, at 1551 (citing Overstreet v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 409 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2005)). One irony of
Justice Stevens‘ speech-plus doctrine is that it rests on the same assumption as
Justice Black‘s concurrence in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers &
Warehousemen (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 77-78 (1964). While Justice Stevens
sees in the combination of conduct and speech a justification for banning
secondary picketing, Justice Black sees the potential for unconstitutional
restriction of free speech. For further discussion, see infra Part III.A.
116. See e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)
(upholding citizen boycott of businesses through peaceful picketing as protected
speech and not conduct eligible to receive compensatory damages); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (finding a statute prohibiting picketing of residences
and dwellings unconstitutional); Police Dep‘t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972) (finding a city ordinance restricting picketing around schools
unconstitutional).
117. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 932-34; Carey, 447 U.S. at 470-71;
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99-102.
118. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-98.
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peaceful picketing.‖119 In Mosley, the ordinance in question
banned all picketing except for labor picketing outside of
public schools.120 Interestingly, the Court drew on two
concurrences by Justice Black in support of its holding121—
one from Cox v. Louisiana,122 and the other from Tree
Fruits.123 The Court noted that ―time, place, and manner‖
restrictions were sometimes necessary for certain types of
picketing, but even then those restrictions must be
―carefully scrutinized‖ and ―tailored to serve a substantial
government interest.‖124 When it came to content-based
restrictions on picketing, however, the Court found that
such restriction ―is never permitted.‖125 Thus, for the Mosley
Court, picketing could not be restricted based on its content
without violating the First Amendment.126
Though Mosley, with its reliance on Justice Black‘s Tree
Fruit concurrence, might have signaled the beginning of the
end for the NLRA‘s secondary boycott ban, the Court would
soon begin to distinguish labor picketing from other types of
picketing.127 In Carey v. Brown, while striking down an
Illinois statute similar to the one in Mosley, the Supreme
Court intimated that public issue picketing is more
deserving of protection than labor picketing.128 Noting that
public issue picketing is ―an exercise of . . . basic
constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic
form‖129 and that such picketing ―has always rested on the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,‖
119. Id. at 94.
120. Id. at 92-93.
121. Id. at 97-98.
122. 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965).
123. 377 U.S. 58, 76 (1964).
124. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98-99.
125. Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
126. See id.
127. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912-13 (1982);
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-68 (1980).
128. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 466-67.
129. Id. at 466 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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the Court dismissed Illinois‘ argument that labor picketing
deserved special protection.130 While not going so far as to
conclusively distinguish between the two types of picketing,
the Court cited to an academic text ―suggesting that
nonlabor picketing is more akin to pure expression than
labor picketing and thus should be subject to fewer
restrictions.‖131
While Carey only insinuated the constitutional
inferiority of labor picketing to public issue picketing, the
Court soon affirmed this distinction.132 In NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., the Supreme Court found that the
First Amendment protected a civil rights boycott of white
merchants.133 While the Court held that certain violent acts
committed by some individuals were not protected activity,
it also held that threats of social ostracism and other kinds
of non-violent coercive pressure were constitutionally
protected.134 Referring to the conduct in question, the Court
stated that ―[s]peech does not lose its protected character
. . . simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them
into action.‖135
The Claiborne Hardware Court, unlike the Mosley or
Carey Court, was quick to clarify that in some instances
restrictions on picketing may be necessary, despite their
―incidental‖ effect on First Amendment freedoms.136 As an
example, the Court cited Justice Blackmun‘s reasoning in
Safeco that ―[s]econdary boycotts and picketing by labor
unions may be prohibited, as part of Congress‘ striking the
delicate balance between union freedom of expression and
130. Id. at 466-67.
131. Id. at 466 (citing EMERSON, supra note 11, at 444-49).
132. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 926 (1982).
133. Id. at 909-11.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 910. This is incredibly ironic given both the language of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B), and Justice Stevens‘ speech-plus doctrine, which suggests that
labor picketing is inherently coercive.
136. Id. at 912 (―Governmental regulation that has an incidental effect on
First Amendment freedoms may be justified in certain narrowly defined
instances.‖).
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the ability of neutral employers, employees, and consumers
to remain free from coerced participation in industrial
strife.‖137 The Court went further by dubbing ―public issue‖
picketing ―essential political speech lying at the core of the
First Amendment,‖ while identifying labor picketing as
speech representative of ―parochial economic interests.‖138
Ultimately, the Claiborne Hardware Court ―indicated that
labor picketing should be regarded as a form of commercial
speech meriting less constitutional protection than political
speech.‖139
Under the Supreme Court‘s analysis, two features
distinguish labor picketing and public issue picketing. First,
labor picketing is viewed as inherently coercive as a result
of its conduct element, which tends to elicit a reflexive
response.140 Second, labor picketing is viewed as a form of
commercial speech,141 which is afforded less protection than
political speech.142 Without these supposedly distinctive
features, secondary labor picketing and public issue
picketing would be constitutionally indistinguishable, and
equally protected by the First Amendment.
III. THE FALSE DICHOTOMY OF LABOR PICKETING AND ―PUBLIC
ISSUE‖ PICKETING
After elucidating the Supreme Court‘s double standard
for labor picketing and ―public issue‖ picketing, the
arguments for First Amendment protection of labor
137. Id. (citing NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 61718 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. Id. at 915 (quoting Henry v. First Nat‘l Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291,
303 (5th Cir. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. Ganin, supra note 13, at 1554 (citing Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at
912-13); see also Brian K. Beard, Comment, Secondary Boycotts After DeBartolo:
Has the Supreme Court Handed Unions a Powerful New Weapon?, 75 IOWA L.
REV. 217, 232 (1989)).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 112-15.
141. Commercial speech has been defined as speech ―related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.‖ Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39.
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picketing almost make themselves. Before making any
arguments concerning the constitutionality of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B), however, it will be important to test the
veracity of the distinctions that supposedly render
secondary labor picketing a less protected form of speech
than ―public issue‖ or political picketing.
A. Is Labor Picketing Really Inherently Coercive?
Justice John Paul Stevens‘ speech-plus doctrine seeks to
justify the ban on secondary labor picketing by arguing that
the conduct element of such picketing makes it inherently
coercive.143 But is this really the case? Justice Hugo Black‘s
concurrence in Tree Fruits raises some doubts.144 Justice
Black was well aware of the conduct element of secondary
labor picketing, and yet he held a view that was in complete
opposition to Stevens‘ view.145 In fact, Black thought that
the mixture of conduct and speech was precisely the reason
why secondary labor picketing should not be subject to
broad prohibition.146 Because a total ban on secondary labor
picketing would include picketing that was not coercive,
Black thought that ―regulation of . . . non-protected conduct
may at the same time encroach on freedom of speech.‖ 147 Of
course, if picketing is somehow inherently coercive, then
Justice Black‘s concerns are inapposite. However, there are
several problems with the speech-plus doctrine and the
conclusion that picketing is inherently coercive.
First, in an era of multinational conglomerates and
powerful corporate interests, it seems unlikely that most
forms of picketing will actually result in coercion. True
coercion—where picketing leaves the picketed employer

143. NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 619 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
144. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen (Tree Fruits), 377
U.S. 58, 76-80 (Black, J., concurring).
145. Compare Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 76-80 (Black, J., concurring), with
Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).
146. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 77-78 (Black, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 77.
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with no choice but to comply with a union‘s demands148—
seems less likely to occur in a world where most businesses
can afford to either tolerate the picketing or to suspend
their business relationship with the primary employer with
whom the union has a labor dispute. While Justice Holmes
certainly made an important point when he wrote, ―a page
of history is worth a volume of logic,‖149 history does not
stand still. Thus, the historical assumption of the inherently
coercive nature of labor picketing does not make much sense
in an era where social, political, and economic forces make it
unlikely that picketing will result in coercion. Moreover, the
basis for the historical assumption that labor picketing is
inherently coercive has been called into serious doubt by
legal scholars for some time now.150
Second, because American labor law as a whole is most
often interpreted by the courts as limiting the rights of
employees,151 there is something disconcerting about labeling
effective picketing—namely, picketing that actually is
effective against an employer—as ―coercive.‖ Given the
incredible power the law gives to employers, labeling a form

148. See, e.g., ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY 14 (2001) (―When we speak about most forms of labor
compulsion, we are talking about situations in which the compelled party is
offered a choice between disagreeable alternatives and chooses the lesser evil.‖).
THE

149. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
150. See Dianne Avery, Images of Violence in Labor Jurisprudence: The
Regulation of Picketing and Boycotts, 1894-1921, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 81-83
(1988) (detailing how the Supreme Court altered the conceptual boundaries of
employers‘ property rights to include access to labor); id. at 96-98 (exploring how
Chief Justice Taft‘s social assumptions influenced his view that ―peaceful
picketing is a contradiction in terms‖ (quoting Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312,
340 (1921))); see also WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 85 (1989) (explaining how equity judges expanded
the contours of property rights, which had been primarily limited to tangible
objects, to include anything that had ―pecuniary‖ or ―exchangeable value‖—
―including a man‘s business or labor‖).
151. See JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
19-28 (1983) (arguing that the underlying assumptions and values of labor law
are weighted towards protecting the interests of management while limiting
employees‘ rights).
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of collective action ―coercive‖ because it actually works
appears to be a decision driven by ideology152—not justice.153
Third, even if one grants that ―coercive‖ is an accurate
description of certain kinds of effective picketing, instead of
finding that secondary labor picketing violates the NLRA‘s
secondary boycott ban because it is coercive, what actually
seems to be happening is that courts and the NLRB are
finding that picketing is coercive because it is picketing!
Thus, the Board will often look to see whether secondary
labor activity looks more or less like picketing when
determining whether a union violated section 8(4)(ii)(B).154
Because the speech-plus doctrine assumes that the
combination of speech and conduct always (or even mostly)
results in coercive activity, the courts and the NLRB tend to
view picketing as inherently coercive.155 This assumption
begs the question and is not born out in fact.156
Fourth, if labor picketing is inherently coercive because
of its combination of conduct and speech, then why should
primary labor picketing be legal?157 In fact, if picketing
always contains a conduct element, then why should any
picketing—labor or otherwise—be free of regulation?158
Since picketing by definition includes more than pure
speech—i.e., people marching around while holding signs—
152. See id.; see also BURNS, supra note 3, at 115-36 (describing how American
labor law works as a system of labor control).
153. See MERRIAM WEBSTER‘S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 636 (10th ed. 1993)
(―[T]he quality of being just, impartial, or fair.‖).
154. See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No.
1506 (Eliason & Knuth of Ariz., Inc.), 355 N.L.R.B. No. 159, at 5-6 (Aug. 27,
2010) (holding, in part, that union members‘ use of a large stationary banner
was not picketing and thus was not a violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)).
155. See supra Part II.
156. See Rakoczy, supra note 13, at 1644 (noting the lack of evidence of the
inherent disruptiveness of certain union picketing tactics).
157. See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(b)(4)(i)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§158(b)(4)(i)(B) (2006) (―[N]othing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed
to make unlawful . . . any primary strike or primary picketing.‖).
158. See Ganin, supra note 13, at 1566 (―[I]f all picketing is inherently
coercive, then all picketing should be subject to regulation on the same terms as
labor picketing.‖).
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all picketing should be subject to regulation similar to that
of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), at least under Justice Stevens‘
speech-plus doctrine. However, the Court has clearly
rejected such unbridled regulation in its ―public issue‖
picketing decisions.159 Moreover, the acknowledgement that
labor picketing and ―public issue‖ picketing both contain a
conduct element that is ―more than‖ speech demonstrates
that the conduct element of secondary labor picketing does
not distinguish such picketing from other forms of
picketing.160
Fifth, even assuming that picketing is inherently
coercive, that does not necessarily justify subjecting
secondary labor picketing to broad prohibition. In fact, the
Court has already stated as much with respect to ―public
issue‖ picketing.161 In Claiborne Hardware, the Court noted
that ―[s]peech does not lose its protected character . . .
simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into
action.‖162 Ironically, the Court partly relied on Thornhill v.
Alabama,163 an early secondary labor picketing case, in
which the picketers‘ object was to ―induce‖ customers not to
patronize a certain employer.164 In light of these holdings, it
is questionable that ―coerciveness‖ offers a substantial
justification for regulating unions‘ free speech rights.165

159. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982); Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980); Police Dep‘t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 95-96 (1972).
160. Ganin, supra note 13, at 1566.
161. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 908-12 (1982).
162. Id. at 910 (emphasis added).
163. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
164. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 909 (―[P]eaceful picketing was entitled
to constitutional protection, even though . . . the purpose of the picketing ‗was
concededly to advise customers and prospective customers of the relationship
existing between the employer and its employees and thereby to induce such
customers not to patronize the employer.‘‖ (quoting Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 99)).
165. At least two commentators have argued that the Court‘s unique
treatment of labor picketing as coercive activity stems from the Court‘s implicit
political alignment with business interests and property rights over and above
labor interests. See Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free
Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938, 959-60
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The above deconstruction of the speech-plus doctrine
demonstrates its failure to articulate a legitimate
distinction between secondary labor picketing and other
types of picketing. Because it does not articulate a feature of
labor picketing sufficiently distinct to separate it from other
types of picketing,166 Justice Stevens‘ theory does not serve
as a bar to a First Amendment challenge to section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
B. Is Labor Picketing More Like Commercial Speech than
“Public Issue” Picketing?
In Carey167 and Claiborne Hardware,168 the Supreme
Court indicated that labor picketing does not deserve the
same level of constitutional protection as ―public issue‖
picketing.
The
―labor-speech-as-commercial-speech
argument‖169 is founded on the premise that there is a
hierarchy of First Amendment values, ―with political or
public-issue speech at its apex and commercial or economic
speech occupying a subordinate echelon.‖170 The Claiborne
Hardware Court explained that ―[a] nonviolent and totally
voluntary boycott may have a disruptive effect on local
economic conditions.‖171 Accordingly, the Court held that
―[w]hile States have broad power to regulate economic
activity, [there is no] comparable right to prohibit peaceful
political activity . . . .‖172 Thus, the ―labor-speech-ascommercial-speech‖ view highlights the economic nature of
(1982); Mark D. Schneider, Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First
Amendment, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1495-97 (1982).
166. See Ganin, supra note 13, at 1567 (―Ultimately, since the inducement of
automatic responses is not an idiosyncratic attribute of labor picketing, the
speech-plus argument fails to account for the disparate treatment of labor and
nonlabor speech.‖).
167. 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980).
168. 458 U.S. at 912.
169. Ganin, supra note 13, at 1569.
170. Id. (citing Carey, 447 U.S. at 466-67; Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at
913).
171. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 912.
172. Id. at 913.
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labor relations, and assumes that all labor speech,
picketing, and secondary activity is primarily economic in
nature, not political. Aside from the irony that the boycott
in Claiborne Hardware caused almost one million dollars
worth of lost business earnings over a seven-year period,173
there are at least two problems with equating secondary
labor picketing with commercial speech.174
First, the Supreme Court has softened its stance on
secondary boycott speech that does not involve picketing.175
In Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Building and Construction Trades Council (DeBartolo II),
the Court held that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does not prohibit
peaceful handbilling176 that advocates a secondary boycott
unaccompanied by picketing.177 The case involved a
construction union‘s peaceful handbilling urging the public
to refrain from patronizing any of the businesses in a
mall.178 The handbilling was secondary activity because the
union‘s primary dispute was with a subcontractor retained
to construct a department store in the mall.179 In holding
that the handbilling was not prohibited by section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B), the Court noted that the handbills did not
utilize ―typical commercial speech . . . for they pressed the
benefits of unionism to the community and the dangers of
inadequate wages to the economy and the standard of living
of the populace.‖180 In other words, the speech utilized in the
173. See id. at 893.
174. Ironically, ―[t]he constitutional status of commercial advertising has risen
as that of labor picketing has declined.‖ Note, supra note 165, at 949 (describing
the Supreme Court‘s increased protection of distinctly commercial speech as
compared to labor speech).
175. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council (DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 588 (1988).
176. ―Handbilling‖ is a term used to describe the distribution of leaflets and
handbills. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1968), overruled on other grounds by Hudgens
v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
177. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 579-80, 588.
178. Id. at 570.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 576.
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union‘s handbills was more akin to ―public issue‖ or political
speech, the restriction of which would pose ―serious
questions of the validity of [section] 8(b)(4) under the First
Amendment.‖181
Given the expansive protection afforded to handbilling
under DeBartolo II,182 it is unfortunate that the Court
maintained its distinction between pure speech and
picketing. Noting that ―picketing is qualitatively different
from other modes of communication,‖183 the Court went on to
reiterate Justice Stevens‘ speech-plus doctrine.184 As has
already been demonstrated, however, the speech-plus
doctrine collapses under the weight of its own
assumptions.185 Without a concrete and reliable means of
distinguishing secondary labor picketing from other forms
of peaceful communication, the DeBartolo II Court‘s
―qualitative‖ distinction between secondary labor picketing
and handbilling for purposes of limiting its otherwise
expansive view of labor speech is unconvincing.186 Thus,
given the collapse of the pure speech/speech-plus dichotomy,
as well as the expansive protection afforded to labor speech
in DeBartolo II, secondary labor picketing ought to be
afforded the same First Amendment protections as other
forms of political speech.
The second problem with categorizing secondary labor
picketing as commercial speech is that it unfairly and
inaccurately characterizes the nature of secondary labor
picketing. While it is certainly possible for a union to picket
a secondary target simply for economic-self interest, even
when unions engage in such pickets they do so for larger
socio-political reasons.187 As one commentator has perceived:
181. Id. at 575.
182. Id. at 579-80.
183. Id. at 580 (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 311 n.17
(1979)).
184. Id.
185. See supra Part III.A.
186. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 580.
187. See Ganin, supra note 13, at 1569-72 (discussing the inherently political
nature of labor picketing); Note, supra note 165 (discussing the inherently
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[A] labor dispute, like a charge of race discrimination, is clearly of
interest to members of the public not directly involved. Indeed, the
success of the union‘s consumer picket depends upon public
interest and support; absent the potential for such interest, there
would be no need for restrictions. Just as the race discrimination
of a single business reflects the broader phenomenon of racism
and the problems of black citizens in a predominantly white
society, a single labor dispute reflects the position of workers in an
economic system based on private ownership and control of
production. Each picket appeals to public solidarity with the
picketing group in its particular dispute and in its larger
188
struggle.

When viewed in the larger political context of workers‘
struggle for dignity, improved working conditions, and
better wages, it is difficult to see how secondary labor
picketing can be separated wholesale from, for example,
African American citizens‘ struggle for racial equality or
women‘s struggle for equal pay.189 This is especially so when
one considers the fact that the latter also exert economic
pressure on the business community.190 Recent boycotts
enacted by a women‘s rights group191 and threatened by
Latino citizens highlight this fact.192
Moreover, to view labor speech through the narrow
prism of commercial interest is to ignore the historical
development of the American Labor Movement and its
members‘ fight for industrial democracy.193 This history
reveals a whole class of people struggling for a voice in
political nature of labor picketing); Rakoczy supra note 13, at 1638-41
(discussing the communicative nature of labor picketing).
188. Note, supra note 165, at 955.
189. Ganin, supra note 13, at 1570-71 (discussing the larger context of
economic struggle and analogizing it to women‘s appeal for equal wages).
190. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912-15 (1982)
(finding that civil rights boycott was protected activity despite its exertion of
economic pressure).
191. See Allison Stevens, Wal-Mart‟s Critics Stage Holiday Protests, WOMEN‘S
(Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.womensenews.org/story/business/051213/
wal-marts-critics-stage-holiday-protests.
ENEWS

192. See Julia Preston, Latino Groups Urge Boycott of Arizona Over New Law,
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, at A16.
193. See, e.g., DRAY, supra note 45, at 225-27.
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determining the conditions in which they find themselves.194
Viewed through this historical lens, labor speech is
overwhelmingly and fundamentally political speech.195 Thus,
labor‘s use of picketing—whether primary or secondary—is
not solely or ultimately commercial in nature, but is more
akin to political appeals to the public to aide workers in
their collective efforts to achieve better terms and
conditions of employment.196 Indeed, even when unions are
concerned mainly with wages, ―the drive for higher wages is
not reducible to monetary concerns,‖ but is symbolic of
workers‘ struggle for ―an affirmation of power, personal
worth, and citizenship.‖197
Further, it must be emphasized that acknowledging the
larger political reality of secondary labor pickets should not
be a matter of aligning oneself with or against labor. For, as
the Court noted in Claiborne Hardware, while certain views
and practices are offensive to others who do not hold those
views, protected political speech ―need not meet standards
of acceptability.‖198 To extend this notion to secondary labor
picketing, if labor speech is in fact political in nature, then
workers‘ rights to express their views on ―the benefits of
unionism to the community‖ or ―the dangers of inadequate
wages to the economy,‖199 should be protected whether those
views are expressed on a picket sign or a handbill, and
whether one‘s political compass is pro-labor or anti-union.
This outcome is logically compelled by the Court‘s First
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Ganin, supra note 13, at 1570-71; see also DRAY, supra note 45, at
122-66 (chronicling the history of organized labor‘s struggle for dignity, living
wages, and the eight-hour work day).
197. Pope, supra note 15, at 1111. Pope goes further and states, ―[t]he more
meaningless the work, the more important this [symbolic importance] aspect of
the wage becomes. Wage demands often reflect perceived inequities rather than
a simple desire for ‗more.‘‖ Id. (citing Jack Fiorito & Charles R. Greer,
Determinants of U.S. Unionism: Past Research and Future Needs, 21 INDUS.
REL. 1, 11 (1982)).
198. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911 (1982) (quoting
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S 415, 419 (1971)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
199. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. 568, 576 (1988).
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Amendment jurisprudence, once the speech-plus doctrine is
shown to be illusory.200
Thus, for the Supreme Court of the United States to
hold that secondary labor picketing does not fall under the
auspices of the First Amendment‘s protection of political
speech is nothing less than a failure to acknowledge the
larger socio-political reality in which workers exist.201 The
Court‘s myopia should not be allowed to so easily
disenfranchise working people of their constitutionally
protected right to free expression.202 Since the objects of
secondary labor picketing extend ―beyond matters of merely
commercial interest and [involve] fundamental public
concerns,‖ it is an error in ontology to restrict secondary
labor picketing by equating it with commercial speech.203 As
such, it is no true obstacle to a First Amendment
constitutional challenge.204 As Professor Julius Getman
concludes:
The distinction drawn between the economic activity involved
in the labor cases and the political activity relating to public
200. See supra Part III.A. In other words, this outcome is logically compelled
because the notion of picketing as an ―inherently coercive‖ activity was an
outgrowth of the view that picketing involved speech ―plus‖ conduct (Justice
Stevens‘ speech-plus doctrine). Since the speech-doctrine was shown to collapse
on itself, supra Part III.A, there is no relevant distinction to justify the
wholesale restriction of secondary picketing. Therefore, if labor speech is
protected political speech, secondary labor picketing is subject to the same
protection as so-called ―pure speech.‖
201. Ganin, supra note 13, at 1572 (―[I]t is inaccurate and belittling to equate
labor protests with mere profit-making activity such as product advertising.‖).
202. Id. at 1570-71 (―[I]t is analytically unsound, historically myopic, and
fundamentally biased to equate labor speech with commercial speech that
simply proposes a commercial transaction or is solely related to economic selfinterest.‖); see also id. at 1572 (―If even political and morally righteous union
activity can be blithely proscribed, then the distinction between labor and
political speech seems to reflect nothing more than class bias.‖).
203. Anderson, supra note 13, at 823.
204. It should also be noted that, to the extent labor speech and political
speech can be separated at all, ―[o]ver the past several decades, historic
transformations in both political systems and labor relations have burst the
boundary between them.‖ Pope, supra note 15, at 1119 (discussing, in part, how
the fluidity of capital and changing contexts of labor disputes have contributed
towards highlighting the political nature of labor protests).
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issues is analytically unsound, historically inaccurate, and
culturally myopic. What, for example, distinguishes the retailstore employees‘ appeal to the public for support, which the Court
held was not constitutionally protected in the Retail Store
Employees Union case, from the public boycott that the Court
protected in Claiborne Hardware? Both cases involve appeals
aimed at achieving immediate economic benefits for a limited
group, and both appeals were ultimately premised on a broader
goal of redistributing economic benefits: to blacks in one case, to
labor in the other. To suggest that one goal is of greater public
concern than the other is to view labor through the Court‘s
artificially created prism by which collective bargaining becomes
205
dissociated from any broader, nobler, more enduring purpose.

IV. SECTION 8(B)(4)(II)(B) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
If the above arguments are correct and persuasive, then
the barriers that the Supreme Court has erected between
labor picketing and political speech—the structural
integrity of which this Comment argues were mostly
illusory—must fall. Having demolished such artificial
constructions, secondary labor picketing is entitled to the
same First Amendment protection as political speech. Once
this congruity between labor speech and political speech is
acknowledged, however, it becomes clear that section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) cannot withstand a First Amendment
challenge and that the statute is unconstitutional.
There are at least two arguments that can be made to
challenge the constitutionality of the NLRA‘s secondary
picketing ban. First, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)‘s ban on secondary
boycotts
constitutes
impermissible
viewpoint
discrimination, and is thus unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.206 Second, the language of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)

205. JULIUS G. GETMAN, RESTORING
MOVEMENT 239-40 (2010).

THE

POWER

OF

UNIONS: IT TAKES

A

206. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010) (finding
statute that restricted corporate election expenditures violated First
Amendment prohibitions against viewpoint discrimination); Members of City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (―[T]he First
Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some
viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.‖).
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is inherently vague, and thus violates due process
requirements.207
A. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) Constitutes Viewpoint
Discrimination
The First Amendment has long afforded speakers
protection from content-based viewpoint discrimination.208
As the Court stated in Mosley:
There is an ―equality of status in the field of ideas,‖ and
government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to
be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by
some groups, government may not prohibit others from
209
assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say.

The Court has consistently held that First Amendment
protection from viewpoint discrimination applies to public
issue and political speech.210 Since labor speech can be
considered to be fundamentally political in nature,211 labor
communications should be afforded the same protection as
other types of political speech under the First Amendment.
Most recently, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed its strong
stance against viewpoint restrictions on political speech in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.212 An
examination of the Court‘s understanding of First
Amendment speech protection and viewpoint discrimination

207. See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (2007) (―[T]he
vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of ‗a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.‘‖ (quoting
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360, 380 (1964) (finding state statutes requiring state employees to take
loyalty oaths unconstitutionally vague).
208. See cases cited supra note 206.
209. Police Dep‘t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (internal citation
omitted).
210. See supra Part II.B.
211. See supra Part III.B.
212. 130 S. Ct. 876, 896-911 (2010).
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in Citizens United will be helpful in understanding why the
NLRA‘s ban on secondary boycotts is unconstitutional.213
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court found that a
federal statute barring independent corporate expenditures
for electioneering violated the First Amendment.214 While
this holding in itself may prove advantageous to labor
unions,215 it is the Supreme Court‘s broad and categorical
statements with regard to First Amendment protection for
political speech that is most relevant to the scope of this
Comment.216 In broad, sweeping language, the Court put to
rest any fears that it would come down softly on
Congressional restriction of political speech.217
Attacking restrictions placed on corporate financing of
election related communications, Justice Kennedy wrote,
―[w]e find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of
political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on
certain disfavored speakers.‖218 In the course of a ten page
lecture against viewpoint restrictions on political speech,
the Court drew on a variety of cases and legislation219—even
213. See generally Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United:
The Future of Labor Speech Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (2011)
(―Citizens United‘s broad articulation of First Amendment principles . . .
undermines the reasoning by which the Court has repeatedly—and at times
inexplicably—upheld limitations on unions‘ picketing and boycott activity . . . .‖).
214. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917.
215. Steven J. Law, Organized Labor and Citizens United, WALL ST. J., March
11, 2010, at A15 (explaining that the Citizens United decision will allow labor
unions to allocate more funds to election expenditures).
216. While the Court‘s discussion of the First Amendment and viewpoint
discrimination takes place in the context of political speech during an election
campaign, the Court‘s use of broad, sweeping language suggests wider
applicability. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898-907.
217. See id.
218. Id. at 899.
219. Intriguingly, the Court discussed the first prohibition of independent
political expenditures by corporations and labor unions under the Labor
Management Relations Act—otherwise known as the Taft-Hartley Act—with
apparent disdain. Id. at 900. The Court was apt to note President Truman‘s
warning that the expenditure ban was a ―dangerous intrusion on free speech.‖
Id. (quoting MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO.
80-334, at 9 (1947)).
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referencing the Framers of the Constitution.220 The Court
emphasized the indispensability of political speech to
decision-making in a democratic society,221 and noted that
the worth of speech ―does not depend upon the identity of its
source, whether corporation, association, union, or
individual.‖222 Particularly galling to the Court was the fact
that the statute restricting corporate expenditures on
election campaigns implicitly denied a political voice to
certain kinds of corporate entities while leaving others
relatively unrestricted.223
In finding content- and identity-based speech
restrictions unconstitutional, Justice Kennedy noted two
particularly disconcerting aspects of such restrictions.224
First, such restrictions are often used as a means to censor
speech by controlling content.225 Second, such restrictions
can function to give preference to certain speakers.226
Speaking of the latter, the Court observed that:
By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the
right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing and
respect for the speaker‘s voice. The Government may not by these
means deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine
for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration.

220. Id. at 906 (―The Framers may have been unaware of certain types of
speakers or forms of communication, but that does not mean that those
speakers and media are entitled to less First Amendment protection than those
types of speakers and media that provided the means of communication political
ideas when the Bill of Rights was adopted.‖).
221. Id. at 904 (quoting First Nat‘l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777
(1978)).
222. Id. (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777) (emphasis added).
223. Id. 905-07 (finding that the federal statute would allow corporations that
owned media outlets to have a political voice, while corporations that did not
have media outlets would be denied a political voice).
224. Id. at 898-99 (―Premised on a mistrust of governmental power, the First
Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or
viewpoints.‖).
225. Id. at 899.
226. Id.
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The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas
227
that flow from each.

The Citizens United Court thus left no doubts about the
First Amendment‘s prohibition of viewpoint restrictions on
political speech. Given the Court‘s reasoning in Citizens
United, and given the fundamental political nature of labor
speech,228 statutes that restrict labor speech because it is
labor speech violate the First Amendment. Based on this
line of reasoning, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is unconstitutional.
Because section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) restricts secondary labor
picketing, while allowing other non-labor groups to engage
in the same activities, the statute constitutes viewpoint
discrimination. Justice Black realized this in his
concurrence in Tree Fruits.229 Under Justice Black‘s view in
Tree Fruits, the union‘s secondary picket was illegal under
the NLRA.230 However, whereas the union was technically
barred from picketing the grocery stores to highlight
employees‘ primary dispute with their employer, a human
rights group (for instance) would be free to picket the
grocery store to inform the public that the apples were
harvested by migrant workers who were mistreated,
discriminated against, and paid low wages.231 Thus, under
227. Id.
228. See supra Part III.B.
229. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen (Tree Fruits), 377
U.S. 58, 76-80 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 76.
231. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, The First Amendment, the Thirteenth
Amendment, and the Right to Organize in the Twenty-First Century, 51 RUTGERS
L. REV. 941, 950-51 (1999). Pope presents a similar hypothetical:
[I]magine two people with signs standing in front of a store called Toy
Town. A unionist holds the first sign, which asks consumers to boycott
Toy Town because it sells Furbies, and Furbies are produced by nonunion slave labor. . . . The unionist‘s message is illegal because it
criticizes the store‘s policy of selling Furbies and urges consumers to
express their disapproval by taking their patronage elsewhere . . . .
Now suppose that there is a third person standing in front of the
store, also carrying a sign. This person is an international human
rights activist, and her sign urges customers to boycott Toy Town
because it sells Furbies, and the Furby company exploits Asian
workers. Like the unionist, the human rights activist is urging a
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Justice Black‘s view, labor unions are subjected to viewpoint
discrimination under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), because they are
denied an opportunity to make themselves heard through
picketing while other groups are given a voice.232 Because
other non-labor groups would be free to engage in secondary
picketing, and because the statute‘s broad ban included
secondary labor picketing with otherwise lawful objects,
Black concluded that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) banned picketing
―only when the picketers express particular views.‖233
The Citizens United Court emphasized that such
viewpoint discrimination ―deprives the disadvantaged . . .
class of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth,
standing and respect for the speaker‘s voice.‖234 With respect
to labor speech as it has been viewed in the context of this
Comment, this means that restrictions that single out
secondary labor picketing deprive unions of the right to
have their voices heard and responded to. Thus, under
contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence, section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) should be held unconstitutional.
One might raise an objection here, recalling Justice
Blackmun‘s acknowledgement, in Safeco, that Congress had
to strike a balance between ―union freedom of expression‖
and neutral employers‘ ability to be free from ―coerced
participation in industrial strife.‖235 That argument might
go something like this: while political speech is generally
protected, the potential for ―industrial strife‖ that can
accompany labor picketing justifies some Congressional
restrictions. Ignoring the speech-plus assumptions that
underlie such arguments for the moment, there is a
separate problem with this reasoning. While the Supreme
secondary boycott of the store. However, her activity is not illegal under
the Act because section 8(b)(4)(ii) applies only to unionists, leaving
others free to engage in precisely the same activities. This violates the
First Amendment principle of neutrality among speakers.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
232. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 79 (Black, J., concurring).
233. Id.
234. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).
235. NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Court has acknowledged that ―[e]ven protected speech is not
equally permissible in all places and at all times,‖236 the
proper legal remedy for preventing potential ―strife‖ is to
subject picketing to ―reasonable time, place, or manner
restrictions that are consistent with the standards
announced in . . . [the Supreme Court‘s] precedents,‖237 not
content-based restrictions on speech.
In Snyder v. Phelps, for example, the Court found that
the Westboro Baptist Church, which had picketed the
funeral of a United States Marine killed in Iraq, had obeyed
all time, place, and manner restrictions applicable to its
activity.238 Having complied with all applicable restrictions,
the Court found that Westboro‘s speech was entitled to
―special protection under the First Amendment.‖239 The
Court went on to point out that Westboro‘s picketing could
not be restricted ―simply‖ because the language used on the
picket signs was ―upsetting or arouse[d] contempt.‖240 Thus,
despite the private harm that Westboro‘s picketing caused
the Marine‘s father, it was not subject to content-based
restrictions insofar as the picketing constituted speech
concerning a public issue.241 If Westboro‘s picketing is
protected under the First Amendment, subject only to time,
place, and manner restrictions, surely secondary labor
picketing ought to be protected as well.242
236. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218 (2011) (quoting Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985)).
237. Id. (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)).
238. Id. at 1218-19.
239. Id. at 1219.
240. Id. at 1218. During the picketing, the Westboro Baptist Church displayed
picket signs that included the following slogans: ―God Hates the USA/Thank
God for 911,‖ ―America is Doomed,‖ ―Don‘t Pray for the USA,‖ ―Thank God for
IEDs,‖ ―Thank God for Dead Soldiers,‖ ―Pope in Hell,‖ ―Priests Rape Boys,‖ ―God
Hates Fags,‖ ―You‘re Going to Hell,‖ and ―God Hates You.‖ Id. at 1213.
241. Id. at 1219.
242. While Snyder involves a multiplicity of issues concerning the Court‘s
First Amendment doctrine, it‘s holding—on its face—brings to light how
embarrassing the Court‘s doctrine on secondary labor picketing really is. On the
one hand, in Snyder, the Court interprets the First Amendment to protect the
speech of a fringe group spouting messages of hatred and bigotry at a military
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In fact, the Court‘s decision in Phelps offers strong
support for the NLRB‘s decision in Sheet Metal Workers
Local 15.243 In that case, a union placed a fifteen-foot tall
inflatable rat in front of a hospital while a union member
distributed handbills to publicize a union dispute with a
labor supply company.244 The NLRB found that the union‘s
implementation of the rat and the handbiller was protected
activity that did not violate section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).245 Referring
to the picket signs used in Phelps, the Board stated, ―[i]f the
First Amendment protects conduct or statements as
disturbing to many as this, surely prohibiting an inflatable
rat display, with a handbill referring to a ‗rat employer,‘
would raise serious constitutional concerns.‖246
The weight of the Court‘s First Amendment
jurisprudence and the fundamentally political nature of
labor speech suggest that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)‘s ban on
secondary
labor
boycotts
constitutes
viewpoint
funeral. Id. at 1220. On the other hand, in the secondary labor picketing cases,
the Court holds that the First Amendment does not protect union picketing of
secondary businesses involved with primary employers who implement practices
inimical to the interests of the working class.
243. Sheet Metal Workers Local 15 (Brandon Reg‘l Med. Ctr.), 356 N.L.R.B.
No. 162, at 4 (May 26, 2011).
244. Id. at 1.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 4. While the Board correctly saw that a decision holding the union‘s
implementation of the rat balloon in violation of section 8(b)(4)(B)(i) would raise
serious constitutional concerns, the Board continues to view secondary picketing
as inherently coercive. Id. at 3. Thus, while the Board correctly saw that a
decision holding the union‘s implementation of the rat balloon would ―raise
serious constitutional concerns,‖ id. at 4, it also distinguished the rat balloon
from picketing. See id. at 3. In other words, if the Board had found the inflatable
rat analogous to picketing, its implementation by the union would have violated
section 8(b)(4)(B)(ii). While it might not be wise for the Board to question
Supreme Court precedent, the juxtaposition of the Board‘s reasoning in Sheet
Metal Workers Local 15 with the Court‘s conception of picketing as ―inherently
coercive‖ shows how the Board‘s efforts to distinguish innovative forms of
secondary activity from picketing verges on becoming no more than a game of
words. After all, it is not difficult to argue that a fifteen-foot inflatable rat—with
an inflatable cigar in its mouth, no less—placed in front of a hospital, embodies
the requisite degree of ―intimidation‖ to violate section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), at least
under the current Supreme Court interpretation of ―picketing.‖ See, e.g., id. at 7
(Hayes, dissenting).
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discrimination.
Because
such
discrimination
is
unconstitutional under Supreme Court First Amendment
jurisprudence, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) should be invalidated.
B. The Language of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is
Unconstitutionally Vague
Not only does section 8(b)(4)(ii)(b) constitute an
impermissible viewpoint discrimination, but its plain
language is also unconstitutionally vague.247 The Supreme
Court‘s vagueness doctrine ―bars enforcement of a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.‖248 With
respect to speech protected by the First Amendment, when
a statute leaves individuals without clear guidance as to
what kind of speech is prohibited, the statute causes those
that might be affected to ―steer far wider of the unlawful
zone than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were
clearly marked.‖249 In light of the Court‘s own statements
about the statute‘s language, a number of recent law review
articles attempting to construe the statute‘s language,250 and
the inability of the statute to provide clear guidance as to
the activity it prohibits, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) fails to survive
the vagueness doctrine.
The Supreme Court itself, as well as several other
federal courts, have commented on section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)‘s
vague language. In fact, the opaque language of the statute
has long been a reason for the Court‘s attempts to limit its
construction. In DeBartolo II, Justice White noted that the
247. See, e.g., DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. 568, 578 (1988) (―But more than mere
persuasion is necessary to prove a violation of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B): that section
requires a showing of threats, coercion, or restraints. Those words, we have said,
are nonspecific, indeed vague, and should be interpreted with caution and not
given a broad sweep.‖ (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
248. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (quoting Connally v.
Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
249. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
250. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 36-37; Ganin, supra note 13, at 1582-83;
Rakoczy, supra note 13, at 1654.

2011]

SECONDARY PICKETING

1307

statute‘s prohibition of ―threats, coercion, or restraints‖ was
―nonspecific‖ and ―vague,‖ and thus should be ―interpreted
with caution and not given a broad sweep.‖251 The District
Court for the Western District of Washington recently noted
that ―coercion‖ is an ―elastic concept,‖ and that the
―nonspecific‖ and ―vague‖ language of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
makes determining violations of the statute a ―complex‖
matter in which courts must use ―caution.‖252 Meanwhile,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has stated that the application of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)‘s
vague language is ―far from self-evident.‖253 Given courts‘
own admissions concerning the opacity of the statute, it is
not clear how ―men of ordinary intelligence‖ could be certain
of its meaning and scope.254 However, as has been shown,255
despite its lack of clarity concerning the activity the statute
was meant to prohibit, the Court has so far upheld the
NLRA‘s ban on secondary boycotts.256
Aside from courts‘ own acknowledgement of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B)‘s foggy language, there are a number of recent
law review notes and comments that point to the vagueness
of the statute.257 While these authors‘ efforts to envision
251. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 578 (quoting NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U.S. 274, 290
(1960)).
252. Point Ruston, LLC v. Pac. Nw. Reg‘l Council of United Bhd. of
Carpenters, No. C09-5232BHS, 2010 WL 3584466, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 10,
2010).
253. McDermott v. Ampersand Pub‘g, LLC, 593 F.3d 950, 967 (9th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 409 F.3d
1199, 1212 (9th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
254. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (quoting Connally v.
Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
255. See supra Part II.
256. If the federal courts‘ recognition of the statute‘s vagueness were not
enough, the NLRB‘s system of labyrinthine rules construing the language of
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) might be. See generally Bock, supra note 19, at 968-69
(detailing the complexity of Board law with respect to determining whether
union activity violates the NLRA‘s ban on secondary boycotts). In addition to the
complexity of Board law in this area, the problem is compounded and
highlighted by the shifts in direction the Board is subject to given the political
appointment of its members.
257. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 836-37 (suggesting new framework for
determining whether activity is coercive); Ganin, supra note 13, at 1583-83
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alternative constructions of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) so to avoid
first amendment violations are interesting and persuasive,
they also are indicative of the statute‘s inherent lack of
clarity. In fact, the variety of attempts by both the courts
and their critics suggests that the real issue is the language
of the statute, and not courts‘ narrowing interpretations.
Consider the plain language of the NLRA‘s secondary
boycott ban.258 The operative language of the statute makes
it an unfair labor practice ―to threaten, coerce, or restrain
any person‖ with the object of compelling that person ―to
cease doing business with any other person.‖259 Nowhere in
the statute are the words ―threaten,‖ ―coerce,‖ or ―restrain‖
defined. The plain meaning of such terms can be used to
cover a broad or narrow array of activities, leaving the
proverbial ―person of common intelligence‖ with no clear
way of knowing which activities are prohibited.
Take ―coercion,‖ for instance. The word‘s dictionary
definition seems clear enough: ―[T]o restrain or dominate by
force.‖260 Yet, the definition is so broad as to cover vastly
different kinds of activity. Even assuming a person of
common intelligence can easily understand ―restrain‖ or
―dominate,‖ what about force? The dictionary definition of
―force‖ includes such varying explanations as ―strength or
energy exerted or brought to bear,‖ ―violence, compulsion, or
constraint exerted upon or against a person or thing,‖ and
―capacity to persuade or convince.‖261 Given these
definitions, ―to coerce‖ might mean a number of things. On
the one hand, to coerce someone to cease doing business
with another might mean forcing someone to refrain from
shopping at a particular establishment through guilt—e.g.,
patrolling while displaying picket signs detailing a
(arguing for a new conception of coercion that avoids restricting protected
speech); Rakoczy, supra note 13, at 1649-50 (suggesting the use of a new
―coercion test‖ to protect unions‘ free speech rights).
258. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (2006).
259. Id.
260. MERRIAM WEBSTER‘S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 222 (10th ed. 1993)
261. Id. at 455.
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company‘s use of sweatshops. On the other hand, it could
mean using threats of violence or physical force to cause
someone to refrain from engaging in business with another.
A world of difference lies between these examples, and yet
the statute is silent as to which, if any, should be banned.
The former activity is arguably protected political speech—
more akin to persuasion—while the latter may be subject to
criminal sanctions. The statute‘s failure to articulate any
clear boundaries between protected political speech and
criminal behavior thus renders it unconstitutionally vague
on its face.262
Further and final proof of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)‘s
vagueness is the vacillation in the courts and at the Board
over unions‘ recent creative attempts to publicize their
disputes through secondary activity. Recall Sheet Metal
Workers Local 15, where the status of a union‘s display of
an inflatable rat was at issue.263 Before the NLRB heard the
case, an administrative law judge found that the union‘s
display of a giant inflatable rat balloon while handbilling at
a secondary target constituted unlawful secondary picketing
under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), despite the fact that an
inflatable rat, by itself, does not threaten, coerce, or restrain
anyone.264 Later, the Board reversed the decision and
dismissed the complaint, finding that the union‘s use of the
inflatable rat did not violate section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).265 In
addition, there has been vacillation between the courts and
the Board as to whether ambulatory street theater, such as
a mock funeral procession, violates the Act.266 Further, in
262. Moreover, the Court‘s traditional understanding of coercion in the labor
context, steeped in assumptions about the inherent violence of workers and
collective action, does not make the statute any clearer, as such assumptions
were not and are not born out in reality. See supra notes 139, 141-43 and
accompanying text.
263. Sheet Metal Workers Local 15 (Brandon Reg‘l Med. Ctr.), 356 N.L.R.B.
No. 162, at 1 (May 26, 2011).
264. Sheet Metal Workers Local 15 (Brandon Reg‘l Med. Ctr.), 2004 NLRB
LEXIS 688, at *13-15 (Dec. 7, 2004), aff‟d, 346 N.L.R.B. No. 22 (Jan. 9, 2006),
rev‟d, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 162 (May 26, 2011).
265. Sheet Metal Workers Local 15 (Brandon Reg‘l Med. Ctr.), 356 N.L.R.B.
No. 162, at 5 (May 26, 2011).
266. See Ganin, supra note 13, at 1562-63.
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2010, the NLRB declared that union members holding large
banners in front of secondary targets does not constitute
unlawful secondary picketing under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).267
The unpredictability of where the Board or a court may find
unlawful secondary picketing demonstrates that the statute
offers no clear guidance as to the activity it seeks to
prohibit. As a result, people of common intelligence must
guess at its scope. This can result in the chilling of
otherwise protected political speech out of fear that it is
restricted.
One might object—and indeed, the Supreme Court has
taken this route—that rules of statutory construction oblige
the Court to construe a statute so as to avoid serious
constitutional problems, ―unless such construction is plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress.‖268 Thus—so the
argument goes—despite the vague language of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B), the Court should attempt an interpretation of
the statute that avoids constitutional problems. There are
at least two answers to this argument. First, as previously
discussed, the legislative history of the statute clearly
indicates Congress‘s intent to broadly prohibit secondary
labor picketing—and that broad prohibition has been shown
to constitute an unconstitutional viewpoint restriction.269
Second, rules of statutory construction should not supplant
the Court‘s vagueness doctrine. In fact, to hold otherwise
would defy logic. For, if a statute is so vague that ―men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application,‖ simple statutory
interpretation will not save the statute itself from
vagueness.270 Unless working people of common intelligence
take up the study of constitutional law en masse, it is a safe
assumption that they will still have to guess at the meaning
and differ as to the application of a facially vague statute.
267. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506
(Eliason & Knuth of Ariz., Inc.), 355 N.L.R.B. No. 159, at 5 (Aug. 27, 2010).
268. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
269. See supra Parts I.C, IV.A.
270. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (quoting Connally v.
Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
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Thus, because section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is ―so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application,‖271 and because
such vagueness contributes to the chilling of protected
political speech, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) should be held
unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has endeavored to show that the
National Labor Relation Act‘s ban on secondary labor
picketing constitutes an unconstitutional viewpoint
restriction on free speech, and that the statute is facially
vague. In pursuit of this goal, this Comment has surveyed
the historical development of the ban on secondary labor
picketing and examined the Supreme Court‘s distinctions
between secondary labor picketing and political speech. In
addition, this Comment has attempted to expose the Court‘s
rationales for distinguishing secondary labor picketing from
political speech as fundamentally illusory and unsound. If
the preceding arguments have been accurate and
persuasive, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA should be
found unconstitutional. This, however, depends in part on
bringing an appropriate case before the Supreme Court.
This, in turn, begs the question: what would an appropriate
case look like?
The answer to this question may very well depend on
the concrete facts surrounding the picketing at issue.
Imagine the following fact-pattern as a possibility.272
Furlong runs a store in a local shopping mall called
Furlong‘s Fur Shop that specializes in clothing made from
real and faux animal furs. Furlong receives a majority of
goods from a major national manufacturer of fur clothing.
As it turns out, the manufacturer is regularly involved in
controversy over its business practices, for two main
reasons. First, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
(―PETA‖) is unhappy with the manufacturer because it
makes all of its goods using real animal furs. Second, the
271. Id. (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
272. See also supra note 231 and accompanying text.

1312

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

union is unhappy with the manufacturer over its low wages
and generally harsh treatment of its employees. Around the
same time, both PETA and the union begin picketing
Furlong‘s Fur Shop, because it carries goods produced at the
manufacturer. Both PETA and the union comply with all
applicable time, place, and manner restrictions. Shortly
after the picketing begins, Furlong files an unfair labor
practice charge with the NLRB against the union for
violating section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA.
In the above fact-pattern, both PETA and the union are
picketing a business with which they have a ―secondary‖
dispute—the only distinction is that the union‘s picketing is
―labor‖ speech, while PETA‘s picketing is ―political‖ speech.
If this Comment has been at all successful, the Court‘s
division between ―labor‖ speech and ―political‖ speech has
been revealed as illusory. Thus, if a case based on similar
facts reached the Supreme Court, the Court should have no
logical choice but to find that the NLRA‘s ban on secondary
labor picketing constitutes an unconstitutional viewpoint
restriction.273 If and when it does so, perhaps the American
273. As an alternative, consider this fact pattern under which a union might
challenge the constitutionality of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B): Manufacturer ―M‖
produces ―green‖ energy-efficient vehicles. Union ―U‖ has a dispute with M over
its recent demands for wage and benefits concessions, despite the fact that M‘s
profits have benefited from recent state and federal tax cuts. In addition to its
labor dispute with M, U opposes the recent tax cuts, which have predominantly
benefited businesses and wealthy citizens while maintaining or increasing the
tax rates for middle-class citizens. In order to express its disdain for both M and
the government, U pickets independent dealer ―I,‖ who primarily profits from
the sale of energy-efficient vehicles produced by M. In addition to pickets
advocating a consumer boycott of the independent dealers, U establishes an
equal number of pickets advocating political action against local, state, and
federal representatives who supported the recent tax cuts. The picket signs
contain messages like: ―Recall Senator R: She Robs from the Poor, Gives to the
Rich!‖; ―Manufacturer M & Senator R—Taking the ‗Green‘ Out of Our Wallets!‖;
―No More Tax Cuts for the Rich!‖; ―Tax Cuts + Wage Cuts = POLITICS AS
USUAL, BUSINESS AS USUAL‖; ―Save Your Green—Don‘t Buy Green‖; ―Say
NO to Corporate Greed!‖; ―Support Union Wages—Boycott ‗I‘!‖; ―Stand up for ‗U‘
and Me—Boycott ‗I‘!!!‖
In light of the arguments presented in this Comment, and given the
essentially intertwined ―labor‖ and ―political‖ messages in the fact-pattern, the
Supreme Court should find that the picketing deserves First Amendment
protection. If so, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) ought to be found unconstitutional.
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labor movement will reclaim some of its legal and political
voice.

